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On appeal from a Judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee by the Second
Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Glenn R. Dawson
presiding, entering judgment on February 11, 2004.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written Promissory Note in August, 1987. Only
two payments were ever made, both in 1987. In October of 2002,15 years later, Plaintiff filed
suit to enforce the Promissory Note, arguing that certain yard care services performed by a
corporation had tolled the six year statute of limitations. The lower court ruled in favor of the
Plaintiff, the Defendant appeals.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this matter
was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from afinaljudgment of the Second District Court,
and the appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Can a Promissory Note (the "Note") signed on August 17, 1987 be enforced

when suit was not filed until October of 2002 (some 15 years after the contract was signed)
given the six year statute of limitations for bringing a contract action?
2.

Whether the rendering of gratuitous lawn care services by a corporation not a

party to the Note is an act of legal sufficiency tantamount to a payment required to toll the
statute of limitations on an expired written obligation owed by an individual.
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3.

Did the gratuitous acts of the Defendant of fertilizing and cutting the Plaintiffs

lawn while he was acting on behalf of a corporation without tendering any money payment
and without executing any written agreement toll the statute of limitations or otherwise
revive the terms of the 1987 promissory note?
4.

Did the trial court err in relying on affidavit testimony, submitted after the close

of the trial, to establish the Plaintiffs damages?
5,

Did the trial court err in failing to award defendant's costs, attorney's fees and

legal expenses?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The issues pertaining to the statute of limitations are questions of law.

"Whether the trial court erred in applying the six-year limitations period is a question of law."
McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1994). The Utah Supreme Court wrote in
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah 1985): "We accord conclusions of law no
particular deference, but review them for correctness."
2.

Whether the Court made a correct conclusion as to the legal requirements of a

contract being met is a question of law. McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.
1994). The Utah Supreme Court wrote in Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1066,1070 (Utah
1985): "We accord conclusions of law no particular deference, but review them for
correctness."
3.

The standard of review as to the admissibility of an affidavit after the trial is a
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question of law. State in Interest ofG.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah App. 1998): "Whether a
statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted in a question of law, which we review
under a correction of error standard. See also State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah Ct.App.
1996), cert denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997).
4.

The actual award of attorneys fees is a question of law with the reasonable

amount being a question of fact. Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 1995). The
trial court abused its discretion in awarding costs because it failed to justify the reasonableness
and necessity of the costs.
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Determinative Case Law:
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d
1226 (Utah 1999); Manwillv. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177 (Utah 1961); Fredericksen v. Knight Land
Corporation, 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App.
l987);Holloway v. Wetzel, 45 P.2d 565 (Utah 1935). Out of state case law supporting
determinative Utah law is: Beckman v. Alaska Dredging Co., 40 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1935) and
Siegel v. McGavock Drilling Co., 530 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Civ. App. 1975).
Determinative Utah Statutes:
U.C.A. § 78-12-23. Within six years - Mesne profits of real property Instrument in writing. "An action may be brought within six years: (1) for the
mesne profits of real property; (2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 7812-22.
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U.C.A. § 78-12-44 Effect of payment acknowledgment or promise to pay.
"In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall
have been paid, or an acknowledgment of existing liability, debt or claim, or
any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought
within the period prescribed after such payment, acknowledgment or promise,
but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to
be charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of defense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose out of an alleged inventory loss in 1979 when the Appellant/Defendant
worked as an owner and manager of a transmission shop in which the Plaintiff/Appellee may
have also had an ownership interest in. The Appellant/Defendant has always disputed the
inventory loss, the amount, and whether the Plaintiff/Appellee was the proper party entitled
to receive payment for the alleged loss since Plaintiff/Appellee had filed an insurance claim
and been paid. However, a Promissory Note was entered into by the parties in 1987 for an
amount of $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) which could have been paid
in full by the tender of $3,750 before June 15th of 1988. The Appellant/Defendant made two
monthly payments in September and October of 1987 and no other payment thereafter.
Appellant/Defendant never signed a new agreement to pay the debt. Appellant/Defendant did
arrange to have lawn services performed, at no charge, for the Appellee/Plaintiff over the next
15 years by his new employer, Lawn World, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Lawn World") of
which Appellant/Defendant is a manager.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment of Judge Glenn B. Dawson of the Bountiful
Department of the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The actual conduct that formed the basis for the Plaintiff/ Appellee's claim in this
case is based on alleged inventory losses from ABCO transmissions which occurred in March
of 1979 (Bench Trial page 7, line 12), some 24 years before the Bench trial occurred in this
case.
2.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff/Appellee did nothing to collect on his debt until August

18, 1987, when he met the Appellant/Defendant at Lee's Cafe and insisted that he sign a
written Promissory Note (the "Note") whereby the Appellant/Defendant promised to pay to
Plaintiff/Appellee in U.S. dollars, the amount of $7,500.00, with payments of $ 100 per month
as a minimum payment. The alleged consideration for the Note was the release of a judgment
by ABCO Transmissions, a Utah Corporation, "(ABCO") against Appellant/Defendant, Leslie
J. Ingram. (Bench Trial, page 2 line 1-22). Additional consideration was given to the
Plaintiff/Appellee as an incentive to the Appellant/Defendant to pay off the promissory note
early by the Appellee/Plaintiff agreeing to take only half of the alleged amount or $3,750.00
if the Appellant/Plaintiff paid by June 15, 1988. (Bench trial, page 2, lines 18-22).
3. The ABCO judgment had been obtained by stipulation via ABCO's insurance
carrier, for the amounts paid to ABCO for certain inventory losses which were insured
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against. (Bench Trial Transcript, p. 8, lines 7-25, p. 9 linesl-10)
4. That judgment that was introduced at trial as Exhibit 2 was obtained on behalf of
the Plaintiff ABCO Transmission, Inc. (Bench Trial, p. 43, lines 22-25) (Bench Trial, p. 44,
line 25, p. 25, line 1-5). ABCO Transmission was represented by the law firm of Strong and
Hanni who represented the insurance company for ABCO Transmission. (Bench Trial, p. 46.
lines 1-9) (Bench Trial, p. 48, lines 11-14) The Note signed by Defendant/Appellant was
made payable to the Plaintiff/Appellee, Robert D. Stultz, (Bench Trial, p. 51, lines 20-22)
who represented that the ABCO judgment could be released if Defendant would personally
pay to Plaintiff the amounts detailed in the Note. (Bench Trial, p. 11, lines 4-12) (Bench Trial,
p. 13, lines 21-25, p. 14, lines 1-4) Yet, Plaintiff/Appellee, Robert D. Stultz was neither an
officer or director of ABCO.
5. Defendant/Appellant presented some evidence that he had an ownership interest
in ABCO at the time of any alleged losses, (Bench Trial, p. 45 lines 14-24)
6. The Plaintiff/Appellee had already received $5,000.00 (Five Thousand Dollars) as
a performance bond from the bonding and insurance company (Bench Trial, page 58 line 1925 and page 59 line 1-3). This compensation should have made the Plaintiff/Appellee whole.
7. A third non named party Tom Beck was the owner of ABCO Transmission and had
come to the Appellant/ Defendant and asked him if the wanted to buy his shop on Redwood
Road. Initially the Appellant/Defendant declined to do so, but Tom Beck asked him to run
the shop for three months to see if he liked it and all the profits that would come in during that
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time would be given to the Appellant/Defendant. The Appellant/Defendant agreed to do so
under that arrangement. (Bench Trial, p. 92, Lines 14-25).
8. The Appellant/Defendant believed that the whole transaction was a phoney deal
based on certain experiences, one of which is that while the Appellant/Defendant was running
the business, Tom Beck was there to see how he was doing and some criminal type people
came into the business via the front door. Tom Beck told the Defendant to tell them he was
not there and headed out the back door. One of men showed the Appellant/Defendant a gun
and they continued to come by the shop looking for Tom Beck. (Bench Trial, page 100, lines
7-20).
9. Eventually, the Appellant/Defendant made the decision to leave the business, called
Tom Beck and told him he thought it was a phoney deal, locked the doors left the keys and
vacated the premises, (Bench Trial, page 101, lines 9-12).
10. However, on August 18,1987, feeling intimidated, Defendant/Appellant did sign
the Promissory Note at issue.
11. The Appellant/Defendant continually denied then and now any obligation to the
Appellee/ Plaintiff or that he owed any money to Appellee/Plaintiff. (Bench Trial, page 104,
lines 14-16)
12. During the six years preceding the filing of the complaint in this action and the
service of summons, the Appellant/Defendant never executed a written document or made a
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payment in U.S. dollars pertaining to the Note. (Bench Trial, page 104, lines 17-22) (Bench
Trial, page 105, lines 8-10)
13. The Appellant/Defendant did not believe he had even a moral obligation to pay
the note because he had been coerced into signing the note. (Bench Trial, page 105, lines 1516).
14. The Appellant/Defendant, neither in his personal capacity or in a capacity as an
Officer of Lawn World, Inc., ever made any payment in dollars or otherwise on the
promissory note after 1987. (Bench Trial, page 104, line 17-22) (Bench Trial, page 107, lines
2-7).
15. The Appellant/Defendant had struck a new deal with Plaintiff whereby lawn care
services would be provided to Plaintiff/Appellee and thereafter arranged to have between
$3,000-$4,000 worth of services rendered to the Appellee/ Plaintiff by an entity known as
Lawn World through a new verbal understanding that presumed the value of services was
enough to satisfy any moral obligation owed to the Plaintiff. (Bench Trial, page 109, lines 1014). (Bench Trial, page 109, lines 15-20) (Bench Trial, page 113, lines 16-18).
16. The Appellant/ Defendant has a memory of the Appellee/Plaintiff demanding
services be performed, but never any demand for payment. (Bench Trial, page 110, lines 1823).
17. The first time the Appellee/Defendant received a demand for payment was when
he got notice of the filing of the complaint. (Bench trial, page 11, lines 1-3).
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18. Regarding the Note and any actual payments, Appellant/Defendant made one
payment of $ 100 in U.S. currency during the month of September, 1987 and a payment of $75
in U.S. currency or check during the month of October, 1987, thereafter the
Appellant/Defendant made no other payments. (Bench Trial, page 104, lines 4-10)
19. In 2001 Appellant/Defendant caused Lawn World to cease rendering free services
to Plaintiff/Appellee declaring that neither he nor the Lawn World owed anything to the
Plaintiff/Appellee or that he had satisfied any obligation that may have been owed.
20. The Note does not call for the payment of services but only for payment of
"dollars". There were no payments made in dollars, as required by the Note which would
have tolled the statute during the six year period of October 1996 through October 2002.
(Bench Trial, page 104, lines 4-10).
21. The only two writings, signed by the Appellant/Defendant, in this matter are trial
Exhibits 3 &4. However, these two documents do not reference the debt or any obligation
owed by the Appellant/ Defendant. They are issued on behalf of a third party Corporation and
are not from the Appellant/Defendant personally. They do reference "services in trade" and
"free services" but not the obligation to pay money to the Plaintiff/Appellee.

(The

Plaintiff/Appellee does not claim to be owed future services; brings no complaint nor alleges
any cause of action for enforcement of a verbal lawn care service agreement.).
22.

The trial record is absent of any evidence of the Plaintiff/Appellee's damages

other than an affidavit submitted as part of the proposed order.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
23. U.C. A. 78-12-23 requires an action to be brought within six years on any contract
in writing. This action was brought fifteen (15) years after the contract was signed and twenty
four (24) years after the underlying consideration for the debt occurred.
24. When a contract is attempted to be enforced beyond the six year period, the Court
must find an act which tolled the statute of limitations, which complies with Section 78-12-44
U.C. A. which requires that a payment of principal and interest have been made by the party
to be charged, or an acknowledgment of the existing debt, which acknowledgment must be
in writing. There is no writing that acknowledges the existing debt. The Plaintiff/Appellee
must show a payment. The rendering of services by a third party corporation pursuant to a
verbal arrangement does not rise to the level necessary to demonstrate that the
Appellant/Defendant was intending to acknowledge the expired debt, be obligated to pay it
in dollars and therefore such services could not be legally considered a "payment" as required
by U.C.A. §78-12-44.
25. The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that the statute of limitations serve
an appropriate purpose and "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber." See Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d
84 (Utah 1981).
26. The statutory requirement of a writing is supported by the Utah Supreme Court
when it stated: "The conclusion we have reached to find support in the fact that by our statute

10

at this time in which an action may be brought is extended by an acknowledgment or a
promise to pay the same but it must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged
thereby. This affirmative provision which has the effect of permitting an outlawed obligation
to be renewed by a promise in writing, indicates an awareness and recognition of the well
established principal that an oral promise will not revive such an obligation." Manwell v.
Oyler, 361 P.2d 177 (Utah 1961). The performing of lawn care services were all pursuant
to verbal arrangements and not a writing.
27. Payment by a third party (in this case Lawn World provided services) does not
obligate another party or joint obligor. "The great weight or authority is to the effect that a
part payment of either principal or interest by one of two or more joint and several obligors
does not of itself suspend the running of the statute of limitations against the other coobligors.. . .the payment must be made by the party to be affected thereby.. .in the contemplation
of the statute, the part payment of a debt is regarded as evidence of a willingness and
obligation to pay the residue, as conclusive as would be a personal promise to that effect." See
Holloway v. Wetzel 45 P.2d 565 (Utah 1935).
28. If a debtor pays on a new obligation it will not toll the statute of limitations against
the old obligation even though the creditor may have decided to apply the payments to the old
obligation, Worden Trading Co. v. Trenka, 602 P.2d 601 (Mont. 1979). The agreement to
perform services was a new obligation that did not revive the old promissory note and its
required payments in dollars.
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29. A new promise must be clear, distinct and unequivocal as well as certain and
unambiguous. The mere acknowledgment of a debt, or the expression of an intent to pay, is
not sufficient to revive the debt. See Beckman v. Alaska Dredging Co., 40 P.2d 117 (Wash.
1935). Defendant/Appellant has always denied the old debt and Note, but did cause services
to be rendered pursuant to a vague verbal arrangement.
30. As to the burden of proof, when it appears on the face of the Complaint that the
action may be barred by limitations, the burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that the statute
has been tolled.

See Bailey v. Superior Court, 694 P.2d 324 (Ariz. App. 1985).

Plaintiff/Appellee has failed to carry this burden.
31. It is clear that the Note exceeds the six (6) year statute of limitations and is
therefore unenforceable absent some act which tolled the statute.
32. There were no payments made in dollars, as required by the Note which would
have tolled the statute during the period of October 1996 through October 2002.
33. The services rendered by the Corporation were pursuant to verbal arrangements
and were never included in the written language of the Note or subsequently reduced to
writing.
34. The two writings, signed by the Appellant/Defendant are trial exhibits 3 &4.
However, these two documents do not reference the debt or any obligation owed by the
Appellant/Defendant. They are issued on behalf of a third party Corporation and are not from
the Appellant/Defendant personally. They do reference "service in trade" and "free services"
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but not the obligation to pay the Plaintiff/Appellee. (The Plaintiff/Appellee does not claim
to be owed future lawn care services; brings no Complaint nor alleges any cause of action for
enforcement of a verbal lawn care service agreement). These two writings are not the
required "clear and unambiguous acknowledgment" of a past liability or promise to pay nor
are they from the Appellant/Defendant personally, as would be required under the statutory.
law and interpreting case law in order to toll the statute of limitations.

The rendering of

services is not tantamount to the "payment" required by statute to toll the limitations of a
cause of action.
35.

Finally, Plaintiff/Appellee is required to prove the fact of damages and the

amount of damages. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah
1985). The record is absent any evidence of the amount of Plaintiff/Appellee's damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S CLAIM IS BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The promissory note is dated August 18, 1987, which is the basis for the
Plaintiff/Appellee's cause of action against the Defendant/Appellant.
The lawsuit the Plaintiff/Appellee filed in this case was filed with the district court in
October of 2002. The lawsuit was filed fifteen (15) years after the note was executed and 24
years after the underlying conduct occurred. The applicable Utah statute of limitations makes
it clear that any cause of action must be brought within six (6) years of the signing of the
13

contract. See U.C.A. §78-12-23 which provides: "An action may be brought within six
years:..."upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing...
In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court explained
the rationale behind the law providing for a statute of limitations which provide deadlines for
claims to be brought within specified periods of time. Justice Oaks quoted the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342,348-349,64 S.Ct. 582,586, 88 L.Ed. 788 (Georgia 1944) which provides:
"The governing policy in this area, as declared by the United States Supreme Court, is that
statute of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of actions that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
In our particular case, these exact factors came to play at the time of the bench trial in
this case. The actual conduct that formed the basis for the Plaintiff/Appellee's claim in this
case was based on alleged inventory loss of equipment from ABCO Transmissions which
occurred in March of 1979 (Bench Trial page 7, line 12). (some 24 years ago). The original
claim resulted in a judgment of $5,000.00 (Five Thousand Dollars) against the
Appellant/Appellee in 1981

which was never collected on or pursued

by the

Plaintiff/Appellee until he presented the promissory note to the Appellant/Defendant in April
of 1987.
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The Appellant/Defendant made an effort at the bench trial to testify of the underlying
facts and past services he provided to the Plaintiff/Appellee and that such were worth $3,000$4,000.00 (three thousand to four thousand dollars) and that the transaction lacked legal
consideration or had been performed as agreed and he had satisfied any obligations owed.
(Bench Trial p. (Bench Trial, page 109, lines 10-14). (Bench Trial, page 109, lines 15-20)
(Bench Trial, page 113, lines 16-18). However, he was testifying of matters that had
occurred over the past 24 years. It is understandable why it was difficult to provide clear
recollection and documentation of the old events.
It is these type of facts which provides the underlying rationale of why there is a six
year statute of limitations in which to bring a cause of action on a written contract. The facts,
documents and dealings pertaining to this lawsuit had slumbered for many years from the
time the events occurred until the actual time of trial. This situation simply results in undue
prejudice to a Defendant.
Other applicable Utah cases have made similar conclusions involving similar periods
of time. In Amundson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass 'n., 13 Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463
(Utah 1962) the Utah Supreme Court held that a recovery on a health and accident policy was
barred where the action was 32 years after the loss and a similar result was found in U.S. v.
Preece, 85 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1936), cert denied, 300 U.S. 660, 57 S.Ct. 436, 81 L.Ed. 869
(Utah 1937).
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This Court may likewise conclude that the Plaintiff/Appellee delayed to long to bring
this action against the Defendant/Appellant and make a finding that the Plaintiff/Appellee's
claim against the Appellant/Defendant is barred by the 6 year statute of limitations found at
U.C.A. §78-12-23.
POINT TWO
THERE ARE NO PAYMENTS BY THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
THAT TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The only way that the Plaintiff/Appellee can argue that his tardiness is excused and this
claim is not barred by the statute of limitations is to show that there are actions done by the
Appellant/Defendant that tolled the statute of limitations.
The trial court's finding after the trial for the Plaintiff/Appellee was based on the
conclusion that lawn care services were sufficient to toll the statute of limitation or were
sufficient acts of payment to satisfy § 78-12-44. (See Findings of Fact paragraphs 6,7,9, 12,
13, 18, and 23).
Utah law specifically defines by statute and makes it clear what must occur in order
for a time barred debt founded on a contract to be revived. The applicable statute is U.C.A.
§ 78-12-44. This statute provides:
In any case founded on contract, where any part of the principal or interest shall
have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim,
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be
brought within the period prescribed for the same after such payment,
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in
writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.
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It is significant that after the Appellant/Defendant signed the Promissory Note in
question, the Appellant/Defendant never signed any other document whereby he promised to
pay the debt in question. The only argument the Plaintiff/Appellee has is that the corporation
the appellant works for performed gratuitous lawn care services for the Plaintiff/Appellee and
that those actions revived the debt. This argument and broad interpretation of the statute
opens the door wide to endless unintended possibilities that would toll the statute of
limitations based on one of the parties intent tied to past interaction, including social dealings
or religious associations whereby one person may render gratuitous service to another who
unilaterally perceives such to be motivated by an old obligation which then revives the time
barred debt. Such a result cannot be the intended certainty and finality that was contemplated
by the statute of limitations and its narrow tolling acts of a written acknowledgment or actual
payment (which usually is in the form of a written check signed by the debtor).
Two long standing Utah cases addressed the issue of what is required to revive a debt
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. These cases are Holloway v. Wetzel 45 P.2d
565 (Utah 1935) and Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177 (Utah 1961).
In Holloway, supra, the losing Plaintiff made the same argument as the
Plaintiff/Appellee makes in this case and it was rejected by the Utah Supreme court. The
Court sets the factual basis as follows: uThis action was commenced August 22, 1933. The
note sued upon is alleged to have come due December 12, 1925. It would be barred if no
payments, acknowledgments, or new promises were made six years thereafter, being
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December 12,1931." In this case, no payments were made by the signatory but the executor
of the signatory's estate was alleged to have made some payments.
The Court cites with approval an earlier out of state case which explains the
appropriate rule of law in our case. The Court wrote with approval the following language:
"A payment to toll the statute, must be made under such circumstances as to amount to an
acknowledgment of an existing liability." 45 P.2d at 568. The rendering of services by a non
party corporation pursuant to a new oral arrangement does not equate to the same level of
required commitment and acknowledgment that an actual payment in dollars would. The two
are simply not the same, one being a lower level of commitment while payment of dollars is
a higher level of commitment or acknowledgment.
The Utah Court explains the rationale that some forms of payment or performance do
not necessarily revive the debt that is due by quoting with approval another out of state case:
"But it must be remembered that payments made by a debtor to his creditor are not always
evidence of a promise to pay the balance of the debt. If the debtor, when he makes the
payment, expressly refuses to pay the balance, or makes such payment under circumstances
that repel the presumption of such promises, no inference can in such be drawn of a promise
to pay the remainder. 45 P.2d at 568.
The court further states that: "Payments made under these circumstances afford no just
grounds to infer any intent to renew the promise of payment, or to extend the time within
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which they were originally bound to pay." 45 P.2d at 569. The court then cites a long line
of cases in accord and agreement with such sound legal principles. See 45 P.2d at 569.
The court concludes: "It follows from what has been said that the claim sued upon was
barred by the statute of limitations, and so judgment in this action was erroneously entered
thereon." 45 P.2d at 569.
In accord, is the Utah Case of Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177 (Utah 1961) where the
Utah Supreme Court held that a claim for contact was barred by the statute of limitations and
that a mere moral obligation and verbal promise to repay the amount owed was not sufficient
to comply with § 78-12-44 U.C.A. and emphasized that a writing was required.
See also Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1997) where the Utah Court of
appeals cite with approval and follow Holloway v. Wetzel, supra, and held that payments
made by a third party did not toll the six year statute of limitations in a contract case.
The Court's emphasis appears to be on the intent of a debtor to be bound as evidenced
by his voluntary payments. Thus a debtor's state of mind to be bound is gleaned from his acts
of payment or written acknowledgment. Plaintiff/Appellee's assertion that the acts of
rendering gratuitous lawn care services by a corporation equates to the same level of intent
to pay an old debt in dollars at some future time or that each time a gratuitous act of service
was performed by the Defendant/Appellant's corporation that it was evidence of the
Defendant/Appellant's intent to still pay in dollars the amount of the promissory note is
simply not credible nor should it be. The debtor's intent should be demonstrated by clear and
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unequivocal evidence of a present and future intent to be bound. That level of evidence
simply does not exist unless, by statutory requirement, the debtor has made a written
acknowledgment or an actual payment towards the debt, neither of which occurred in this
case. (The Plaintiff carries the burden of proof on these issues.)
An examination of some out of state cases provide further rationale and analysis as to
why the Plaintiff/ Appellee's claim for money due under the Note should be barred by the
statute of limitations.
A well written case with an excellent enunciation of legal principles is Beckman v.
Alaska Dredging Co., 40 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1935). This case presents very similar facts to the
case at bar and the same issues raised. A note was signed by the Defendant and the issue
presented to the court was what was needed to revive a debt that on its face was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court wrote the following language citing numerous other legal
authorities (citations omitted): " If the cause of action is to be revived, it must be based wholly
on the written statement. 'A new promise, must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal, as well
as certain and unambiguous. The mere acknowledgment of a debt, or the expression of an
intention to pay, is not sufficient to revive the debt." 40 P.2d at 119.
This legal principle should be of great benefit to this court in deciding the case at hand
because there is no written statement signed by the Appellant/Defendant and thus this claim
should be held by this court to be barred by the statute of limitations.
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See also Siegel v. McGavock Drilling Co., 530 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Civ. App. 1975),
wherein the Texas Court of Appeals reasoned that a claim brought after the limitations period
is actually a claim on the new debt, "which is independent of, but made in consideration for,
the previous debt." at 896. Arguably, the Plaintiff/Appellee may have a claim for a new
contract dealing with lawn care services, but has not brought any such action or claim.
A survey of the learned treatises on this subject show approval for Defendant/
Appellant's position in this case. In Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, One Volume
Edition, subsection 233, page 316 (1 Volume Edition, 17th reprint, West, 1952) we find the
following language: "Must the New Promise be in Writing? In most states, by statute, the
new promise to pay a barred debt is not enforceable unless it is in writing." This statement
seems to presume and approve the notion that payments must be in written form.
In Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts, Hornbook Series, One Volume
Edition, page 232 (1 Volume Edition, Fifth Edition, West, 2003), the legal principle is
enunciated as follows: "Statutes in most states require the subsequent promise to pay the debt
or the acknowledgment of the debt to be in a signed writing." No such written and signed
acknowledgment in contract, letter or payment form exists in this case that would toll the
statute of limitations.
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POINT THREE
THERE IS NO ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN
WRITING THAT TOLLED THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
§ 78-12-44 U.C.A. requires a written promise or acknowledgment to pay the debt,
signed by the debtor in order to toll the statute of limitations.
51 Am Jur 2d § 318, page 653 gets right to the point and states: "An express promise
to pay a debt, to be sufficient to toll or restart the statute of limitations, must be clear, explicit,
unconditional and unequivocal." (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the statute and cases cited above that point out the need for an
acknowledgment in writing to revive a debt, the following points of authorities support the
Appellant/Defendant's position that lawn care services are not enough to revive the expired
obligations of the Promissory Note.
An excellent historical discussion of the development of U.C.A. 78-12-44 is found at
State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, 894 P.2d 1270,1276 (Utah App. 1995).
Justice Wilkins wrote for this court as follows: "Section 78-12-44 stands for the proposition
that, in any case founded upon a contract, a new promise, part payment, or acknowledgment
of a past debt or obligation acts to extend the applicable statute of limitations. This statutory
exception to the running of the statute of limitations is a codification-and modification-of an
early common law rule." 894 P.2d at 1276. (Citations omitted).
Justice Wilkins explains the historical development of this legal principle when he
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continues on: "Historically, statutes of limitation in this country were developed from English
parliamentary acts and contained no part-payment or acknowledgment exceptions to prevent
the operation of the statutes." 894 P.2d at 1276.
It is clear from Justice Wilkins discussion of the development of U.C.A. 78-12-44 that
the Courts have been very conservative in extending statute of limitations without the
necessary writing and in State Bank, supra, they refused to extend the statute of limitations.
54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 261 page 238 discusses the requirement of a writing
and cites a Utah case, Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co, 80 P.2d 471 (Utah 193 8), rehearing denied,
82 P.2d 565 (1938), to support the legal proposition that "where a statute so provides, a
promise or acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged in order
to revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations." In Bracklein, supra, the Court wrote:
"Of course, where the bar of the statute of limitations is effective against the debt, where the
statute has run and it is sought to avoid the effect by a new promise or acknowledgment, such
promise must be in writing and signed by the party to be bound because it in effect revives or
creates a new legal liability which could not otherwise be asserted or established..." 80 P.2d
at 478.
In Samples-Ehrlich v. Simon, 876 P.2d 108 (Colo. App. 1994) the Colorado Court of
Appeals analyzed a promissory note case and held that oral promises by the debtor did not
toll the statute of limitations and the statute of limitations accrued when the demand note was
executed.

The Colorado court cited the tried and true legal principle:"However, an
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acknowledgment or promise cannot be evidence of a new or continuing contract sufficient to
bar application of the statute of limitations unless it is in writing." 876 P.2d at 110. Thus, the
verbal arrangements of providing gratuitous lawn care services could not equate to an
acknowledgment or promise in writing to pay as required by statute.
The District Court of Columbia further explained the underlying background and
rationale as to why statute of limitations are not extended without a specific new
acknowledgment in writing as they discuss a similar D.C. federal contractual statute to U.C. A.
78-12-44, in the case of Partnership Placements v. Landmark Insurance, 722 A.2d 837 (D.C.
1998) when Justice Terry wrote: " An acknowledgment must be made either to the creditor
or to someone acting for him. or to some third party with intent that it be known by and
influence the action of the creditor." 722 A.2d at 843. There was a letter in that case that the
court did not find was an unequivocal acknowledgment and the Court refused to extend the
statute of limitations in the case.
InBulmerv. Belcher, 527P.2d 1237 (Ariz. App. 1974) the Court of Appeals of Arizona
makes it very clear what is required to revive a contractual obligation under the statute of
limitations. Judge Krucker wrote: "For an acknowledgment of an indebtedness to effectively
remove the limitations bar, the acknowledgment must be in writing, signed by the party to be
charged, must sufficiently identify the obligation referred to, thought it need not specify the
exact amount or nature of the debt, must contain a promise, experss or implied, to pay the
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indebtedness, and must contain, directly or impliedly, an expression by the debtor of the
"justness of the debt." (Citations Omitted). 527 P.2d at 1239.
Other cases that are in accord are: Fineberg v. Credit Intern Bancshares, Ltd. 857
F.Supp. 338 (D. Del. 1994); Radcliffe v. Franklin National Ins. Co. Of New York 298 P.2d
1002 (Oregon 1955); Siegel v. McGavock Drilling Co., 530 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Civ. App.
1975).
These courts are clear that the acknowledgment must be in writing and seem to imply
that the payment should be also. Perhaps this court should establish a bright line standard that
acknowledgments and payments must be in written form, signed by the debtor in order to
comply with § 78-12-44 U.C.A.
As there is simply no written acknowledgment in this case of the Note, a time barred
debt, and the rendering of lawn care services pursuant to verbal arrangements does not rise
to the requirements of § 78-12-44 U.C.A., the lower court's ruling should be reversed.
POINT FOUR
DID THE COURT ERR IN AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE WHO FAILED
TO PUT INTO EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT
OF HIS DAMAGES DURING TRIAL?
In this case the Plaintiff/Appellee failed to put on any evidence of the amount of his
damages. The record is devoid of either testimony or exhibits which would establish the
calculations, payments and offsets which were owed under the Promissory Note, assuming
it is enforceable.
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It is well established law that the Plaintiff has the burden to produce sufficient evidence
to establish both the fact of damages and the amount. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
States Tel, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); and Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., Inc., 722 P.2d 773
(Utah 1986).
Further, as the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled "damages must be proven as an element
of one's claim during the trial." At 817. The Court went on further stating:
It would be improper to provide a party with 'another bite of the apple' by
allowing him another opportunity to prove a missing element of his case, be it
damages, existence of a contract or note, fact of negligence, or any other
essential part of his claim.
at 817.
Hence, where the Plaintiff/Appellee has failed to put into evidence his reasonable
amount of damages, his claim must fail. To attempt to supplement this deficiency by way of
affidavit, after the trial, deprives the Defendant/Appellant the right of cross examination,
rebuttal testimony and other guaranteed rights that are mandated by the rules of trial
procedure. Defendant/Appellant's evidence in rebuttal during trial would have included the
reasonable value of the services rendered by Lawn World and further would have included
alternate calculations of principal, interest and late charges. Defendant/Appellant did not put
in such rebuttal evidence since there was nothing to rebut, given Plaintiff/Appellee's failure
to put on any evidence of damages during the trial.
Therefore, assuming the Promissory Note is not time barred, the Plaintiff/Appellee's
damages could only be nominal due to lack of evidence at trial.
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POINT FIVE
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT SHOULD RECEIVE AN
AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS IN THIS CASE,
The court should have awarded the Defendant/Appellant attorney's fees, costs and
expenses in this case since the cause of action pled is based on a written (but arguably
unenforceable) Promissory Note. The note provides for payments of "reasonable attorney's
fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs..." The Utah statute § 78-27-56.5 allows the
Court to make reciprocal an attorney's fees clause arising in a civil action based on a
promissory note executed after April 28, 1986.
Several courts have held that the statute of limitations creates a bar to the desired
remedy, but it does not extinguish the debt or the written document. See, Cooper v. First
Interstate Bank, 756P.2d 1017 (Colo.App. 1988);/fo/terv. Waco Scaffolding & Equip., 797
P.2d 790 (Colo.App. 1990); and Helca Mining Co. v. Idaho Tax Corn'n., 697 P.2d 1161
(Idaho 1985). Thus, on remand, the trial judge should be instructed to hold an evidentiary
hearing as to what the Defendant/Appellant's reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses
were in defending the time barred claim and in filing this appeal for relief.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant asks this court to reverse the opinion by the Trial Judge and grant
an award of fees and costs to Defendant/Appellant. The claim first arose in 1979 and was
then reduced to a promissory note in 1987 and finally a lawsuit was filed in 2002. The
Appellant/Defendant never agreed in writing to pay the debt and none of the documents
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produced by the Plaintiff/Appellee from Lawn World are sufficient to revive the debt.
Services provided by Lawn World do not rise to the level of "payment" as required by § 7812-44 U.C.A. Plaintiff/Appellee's case should be dismissed and costs be awarded to the
Appellant/Defendant.
Dated this

^

day of August, 2004.
DURBANO LAW FIRM

Douglas M/^urbano
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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